

## Point of View No. 46

# Military Presence in South Lebanon - Asset or Liability

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Over the past few days, the IDF has been taking over territories in the south of Lebanon in order to create a "security zone" until the arrival of an international force (**Ha'aretz**, 8/3/06).

**The Reut Institute forewarns** that Israel's military presence in south Lebanon may turn from an asset into a liability. Israel may find itself maintaining a prolonged military presence under Hizbullah's fire, without certainty regarding the arrival of an international force.

#### What is the Issue?

- The IDF has taken over a security zone in south Lebanon, similar to the one held by Israel until its withdrawal from Lebanon (5/00).
- The objective of the military presence on the ground is to create a zone which is "clean" of Hizbullah forces, and to prepare the ground for the arrival of an international force, following a ceasefire agreement.
- Due to the complexity of deploying such an international force, there may be a substantial "interim period" between a ceasefire and the deployment of the international force. (See: <u>International Involvement Predicament (4) The Interim Period</u>).
- Israel's objectives are to minimize the length of this interim period, the end of which will be the establishment a new military-political arrangement that would undermine Hizbullah's ability.

# Why is this Important? Why Now?

- The interim period may allow Hizbullah to restore its military capabilities, earn renewed support within the internal Lebanese arena and might even obstruct the deployment of the international force.
- Therefore, the IDF may find itself in south Lebanon, constrained by the ceasefire agreement, while exposed to Hizbullah's guerilla attacks and with no certainty regarding the deployment of an international force.

### **Policy Options**

- The longer the interim period is, Israel's military presence will turn from an asset into a liability and it will lose its political leverage. Therefore, Israel should aspire to a ceasefire agreement with a clear timetable regarding the deployment of the international force.
- Israel should question whether a military presence after the ceasefire will serve its objectives.
- Moreover, in light of the political obstacles to an effective international involvement, Israel should examine the alternatives to the deployment of an international force.

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